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Abstract
The Spanish Inquisition (1478-1834) lasted for more than three centuries and conducted
more than 100,000 trials. Why would the Spanish Crown adopt this type of repressive
institution? What were the actual motives of its activity? This paper explores the role
of the Spanish Inquisition as a repressive tool of the Spanish Crown. When the Crown
had to move military resources abroad to fight a war, the likelihood of an internal revolt
against the Crown increased. To minimize the threat of rebellion, the Crown would use
the Inquisition to increase repression (trials) in Spain. In a theoretical framework, I
show that while the Inquisition would conduct more trials the higher the intensity of
the wars fought abroad, it would however decrease its level of repression (trials) if the
likelihood of an internal revolt were large enough. This behavior indicates an inverse-U
relationship between inquisitorial and war intensity. To test this prediction, I assemble
time series data for seven Spanish inquisitorial districts on annual trials of the Inquisition
and wars conducted by the Spanish Crown between 1478 and 1808. I show that there is
an inverse-U relationship between wars and inquisitorial activity. My results are robust
to the inclusion of data on the severity of the weather (droughts) and to adjustments for
spillover effects from districts other than the main district under analysis. Moreover, using
a new database of 35,000 trials of the Inquisition, I show that religious persecution was
especially significant during early stages of the Inquisition, while repressive motives better
explain its behavior in later periods.
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1 Introduction
The rise and development of the nation-state in early modern Europe is a historical example of
the relationship between institutions and economics.1 The literature has emphasized the role
of European politics and the so-called military revolution as possible causes of this emergence.2
The introduction of new war technology (e.g., the cannon) in the middle of the fifteenth century
not only changed war strategies, but also caused an increase in war expenses. States had to
both acquire new and costly technology and improve defense infrastructures. A centralization
of power and authority helped to increase fiscal revenues and improve access to public debt to
finance interstate wars.
Kings also used two forms of violence against their own citizens: repression of local enemies
and wealth extraction.3 The former ensured political stability and concentration of power,
while the latter increased fiscal revenues to finance interstate wars. Gennaioli and Voth (2012)
show how states that faced low internal political fragmentation (e.g. France and England)
recruited large armies and reinforced the centralization of power. On the contrary, states that
faced high levels of political fragmentation (e.g. Poland and Spain) could not engage in high
cost wars since internal division prevented it.
Therefore, the organization of internal and external conflicts partly shaped institutions of
early modern European states. States would allocate resources across different types of violence
and organize their institutions depending on their goals and finances. These differences in
institutional frameworks induced a diverse range of institutional development and economic
patterns. North (1991) and North and Thomas (1973) find that states that ensured property
rights promoted economic growth, while states that generated an inefficient set of property
rights harmed economic development.
Although Spain has been traditionally considered as a country that did not ensure prop-
erty rights,4 recent works by Blaydes and Chaney (2011), Alvarez-Nogal and Chamley (2012)
1This process is defined as the “consolidation of political and military power that occurred in Europe in the
early modern period”, Bean (1973).
2Bean (1973) Brewer (1990) and Tilly (1985) examine the relationship between war and political power.
3Tilly (1985) also emphasizes the role of protection defined as the “elimination of the enemies of their clients”.
For example, the elimination of the commercial competitors for the local bourgeoisie
4Some examples are Davis (1973), De Long and Shleifer (1993) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2005).
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and Grafe (2012) emphasize the role of the Spanish Parliament and towns in constraining the
King, especially in the 15th and 16th centuries.5 Thus, the organization of early modern Span-
ish institutional framework, including its characteristics, mode of development and economic
interactions, remains partially unclear.6 In this paper, I study the Spanish Inquisition, an
institution developed during the process of emergence of the Spanish nation-state, to exam-
ine the relationship between war making (external conflicts), internal conflicts (revolts) and
repression.
The Spanish Inquisition was officially founded in 1478 by means of a papal bull of Sixtus
IV, who ceded its control to the Spanish Crown. Since then until its definitive abolition in
1834, the Spanish Inquisition conducted more than 100,000 trials that featured Jews, Muslims,
Lutherans and other assorted “heretics”.7 Its relevance in Spanish history is twofold. First, it
lasted for more than three hundred years, since its creation at the beginning of the Spanish
Empire to its abolition when Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808.8 Second, it was the first
institution that had uniform de facto power over the entire Spanish territory. For this reason,
General Council of the Inquisition became the second most important political institution in
early modern Spain.9
I argue that the Spanish Crown used the Inquisition to prevent internal revolts by repressing
any political ideology that differed from the official political establishment. Spanish King’s
demand for repression increased when he had to move military resources abroad because
the likelihood of an internal revolt against the Crown increased. To minimize the threat of
rebellion, the Crown would use the Inquisition to increase repression (trials) in Spain. In a
theoretical framework, I show that while the Inquisition would conduct more trials the higher
the intensity of the wars fought abroad, it would however decrease its level of repression (trials)
5For instance, they emphasize the role of the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament, in the 16th century as
being much more relevant than the role traditionally assigned in the literature. They also argue how bilateral
negotiations between the Spanish King and Spanish towns constrained the King in the 17th and 18th centuries.
6Drelichman’s research on la mesta and the American silver and Grafe’s works address part of the Spanish
institutional framework at that time.
7Other type of heresies include bigamy, blasphemy, solicitation, fornication, superstition, false witness,
oposition to the Inquisition and eating meat during fast.
8The final year of abolition was 1834. Between 1808 and 1834 it was abolished and reinstated several times,
without having any influence on Spanish political and economic development.
9The General Council ruled and supervised all inquisitorial activity. The first institution of political impor-
tance was the General Council of Castile, which ruled and controlled the Crown of Castile.
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if the likelihood of an internal revolt were large enough. There is no need to incur in costly
repression to prevent a revolt that is going to happen with certainty.10 This behavior indicates
an inverse-U relationship between inquisitorial and war intensity. To test this prediction,
I assemble time series data for seven Spanish inquisitorial districts on annual trials of the
Inquisition and wars conducted by the Spanish Crown between 1478 and 1808. I show that
there is an inverse-U relationship between wars and inquisitorial activity. My results are
robust to the inclusion of data on the severity of the weather (droughts) and to adjustments
for spillover effects from districts other than the main district under analysis.
Repression is arguably not the only reason for inquisitorial activity. Historians have focused
on two other motivations behind inquisitorial activity: extracting wealth through confiscations
to finance public expenses and religion persecution.11 These three different hypotheses are
not exclusive and all can explain inquisitorial activity. To disentangle the three possible
explanations, I use the database described above and I assemble a new database of 35,000
Inquisition trials. Individual trial data will allow to determine, for instance, how wars and
time are related to the different charges in inquisitorial trials. I present evidence that religious
persecution was especially significant in the early stages of the Inquisition, while repressive
motivations better explain the behavior of this institution in later periods. I do not find
evidence supporting a wealth extracting motivation by the Inquisition.
This paper addresses the trade-off between international wars, internal conflict and repres-
sion by studying the role of the Spanish Inquisition between 1478 and 1808. In the same line as
Gennaioli and Voth (2012), this paper supports the thesis that Spanish political fragmentation
could prevent Spain from engaging in high cost wars. However, I show that the Spanish Crown
used the Inquisition to repress Spanish population and, therefore, was able to engage in those
wars. Therefore, the Inquisition was a tool to overcome a lack of political unification, which
seem crucial in European wars success between 1500 and 1800.
10As I will show later in the paper, that situation happened when most of the Spanish army was abroad
fighting wars against other European powers (i.e. France, England).
11Llorente (1822) proposed that the main objective of the Inquisition was extraction of wealth from those
who were accused. Netanyahu (1995) proposed that the main and only motivation of the Inquisition was
persecution of Judaism.
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2 Motivations behind Inquisition trials
The black legend of the Spanish Inquisition sets it up as an institution, whose main mission
was to eradicate any activity or behavior suspicious of heresy (mainly Judaism). However, if
we look carefully at the data we can observe two facts. First, as we can see in Table 1, the
relative number of executions by the Spanish Inquisition did not differ from other European
countries. The two distinctive features of the Spanish Inquisition are its absolute number of
trials and the persistence of its activity. Figures 1 through 4 show the number of trials and the
intensity (trials per thousands of people) of other European repressive institutions or witchcraft
episodes in Europe and Inquisition trials in six Spanish regions. We observe that not only the
total number of trials was larger in the Spanish inquisitorial districts, but the intensity (trials
per thousand inhabitants) and persistence of the Spanish Inquisition were greater compared
to other European repressive institutions or to European witchcraft episodes.
Second, trials against Islam, Jewish and Lutherans accounted for barely half of the total
trials of the Inquisition. Table 2 shows that the proportion of religious trials12 was lower than
the proportion of non-religious trials. This was the case both at the national level and for all
districts with the exception of Valencia, which exhibited the highest concentration of moriscos
in Spain.13 Thus, the data suggests that inquisitorial activity cannot be explained by purely
religious motives. Historians have extensively debated which were the actual reasons behind
inquisitorial activity: income maximization, religious persecution and social control.
Very early on, Llorente (1822) proposed that the Inquisition was essentially an income
maximizing institution. He argued that its main objective was the extraction of wealth from
accused people through confiscations and penalties.14 Later on, Millan (1984) and Kamen
12I define religious trials as those carried out against Islam, Lutherans and Jewish.
13Moriscos were Muslims that converted to Catholicism.
14There are also popular stories from across Spain that would support Llorente’s hypothesis. Bouzas and
Domelo (2000) tell the following popular story. Sometime in the late 16th century María Soliña married Pedro
Barba, a fisherman and one of the wealthiest men of Cangas, a village in Galicia, Spain. Barba owned real
estate, a boat, and a share of the donations collected by the churches Colexiata de Cangas and Iglesia de San
Cibrán. In 1617, the Turks sacked the village of Cangas. Thirty-three people died, almost two hundred houses
were burned and most of the fishermen’s boats and gear were destroyed. According to the story, Maria lost her
husband and her son in the attack; subsequently, she inherited all her husband’s possessions. In the aftermath
of the conflict the local nobility of Cangas, along with the village’s richest men joined with the Inquisition to
denounce “witches”– typically women with significant wealth. If convicted (or confessed) the Inquisition would
seize the “witch’s” wealth, some of which would also accrue to the local nobility. The nobles and others accused
Maria of being a witch, offering as a proof that she used to go for a walk on the beach every night in order
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(1965) disagreed regarding this hypothesis. On the one hand, Millan argued that the amount
of confiscations and penalties represented a small proportion of total inquisition’s wealth. On
the other hand, Kamen emphasized that confiscations not only improved inquisition finances
in a direct way and, therefore, Millan’s conclusions would represent a lower bound of their
importance.
Netanyahu (1995) proposes that the main and only motivation for the Inquisition was
religious persecution, mainly against Jews. This persecution and the creation of the institution
would have arisen from the popular pressure to eradicate heresy.
The third motivation describes the Inquisition as a repressive tool of the Spanish Crown
to suppress any ideology that differed from the official one to prevent a hypothetical revolt
or political conflict. There is anecdotal evidence that inquisitorial activity depended upon
the Crown’s needs. For example, Haliczer (1990) explains how the Crown sought inquisitorial
intervention to repress political disturbances in Valencia during the 1620’s and Boeglin (1993)
describes how inquisitorial repression depended upon the imperial and commercial interests of
the Crown.15
As far as I know, there is no previous research addressing the Spanish Inquisition in the
economics literature. However, there has been a recent growing interest in economics in study-
ing persecution. In particular, Miguel (2005) and Oster (2004) investigate how witchcraft trials
are related to adverse weather shocks. Miguel (2005) finds evidence that negative economic
shocks (associated with high levels of precipitation) increase the number of witch-killings in
Tanzania. He argues that “witches” are usually unproductive old women whose families cannot
afford to sustain them during economic downturns. Oster (2004) finds evidence of a causal
relationship between weather conditions and witchcraft in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-
teenth centuries in Europe. She uses weather data from the little ice age period to explain
witch trials. When an anomalous decrease in temperature occurred, there was an increase
in the number of witch trials. Whereas witchcraft episodes seem to be a popular reaction
to commune with her husband and son; she was tortured until she confessed and her possessions were seized.
The story ends with Maria dying poor and alone.
15In particular, there is anecdotical evidence that Conde Duque de Olivares (Spanish prime minister between
1621-1643) told the Inquisition not to persecute Jewish Portuguese bankers because they were lending to the
Spanish King.
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and pressure against some citizens because of weather and economic downturns, the Spanish
Inquisition was an organized institution that did not necessarily require a popular reaction to
accuse someone. It had a whole network of informers and representatives that covered all of
the Spanish territory. There is at least another repressive institution that could be compared
to the Inquisition: Stalin’s system of repression. Harrison (2008) uses a qualitative explana-
tion to explain Stalin’s choices between military power and repression when facing foreign and
domestic threats in 1930’s.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Organization
The Spanish Inquisition officially started in 1478 with a papal bull of Sixtus IV that established
the Holy Office and ceded its control to the Spanish Crown. From that moment until its
definitive abolition in 1834, the Spanish Inquisition conducted more than 100,000 trials against
Jews, Muslims, Lutherans and other assorted “heretics”. The Inquisition was a centralized
institution that had the same de facto power throughout the Spanish territory.16 The General
Inquisitor and the Supreme Council of the Inquisition (La Suprema) coordinated and controlled
the finances of all districts as well as their monthly activities and procedures.
The Inquisition divided Spain in twenty districts, which were grouped in two subdivisions
of ten districts each: Castile and Aragon. Figure 5 depicts a map of the Iberian Peninsula with
the Inquisitorial subdivisions of Aragon and Castile colored in grey and white respectively. This
geographical distribution is very similar to the Spanish political distribution at that time.17
The organization of the Inquisition emphasizes the idea of a centralized institution that
controlled the whole kingdom, but, at the same time, it suggests that regional and local
differences may have been important. For example, the General Council of the Inquisition,
La Suprema, could control the level of activity, but the regional districts would differ in the
relative number of trials of each type of heresy. This local and national features will be exposed
16For this reason, its General Council became the second most important political institution in the early
modern Spain.The General Council ruled and controlled all inquisitorial activity. The first institution of
importance in Spain was the General Council of Castile, which ruled and controlled the Crown of Castile.
17The two most important and extensive Spanish kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, Castile and Aragon,
merged in 1469 with the marriage of the Catholic Kings.
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later in the paper when I confront religious and repressive motives of inquisitorial activity.
The intensity of the inquisition activity also varied across time. Historians, see Escandell-
Bonet and Perez-Villanueva (2000), have identified five periods of the inquisitorial activity,
taking into account the intensity and patterns of the behavior associated with the Inquisition.
These periods are as follows: 1478-1519, 1520-1569, 1570-1621, 1621-1700 and 1700-1808.
Severe persecution of Judaism characterized the first period of the Inquisition (1478-1519),
while the second period (1520-1569) responded to a consolidation phase with the creation
of tribunals all over Spain. The third period (1570-1621) saw a persecution increase of Old
Christians and also the raise of the persecution against Lutheranism after the conclusion of the
Council of Trent (1563). An increase of persecution against Judaism, judeoconversos as well
as the continuation of repression against Old Christians distinguished the fourth period (1621-
1700). The final period (1700-1808) saw a decrease of the overall activity of the Inquisition
partially caused by the influence of the French Enlightenment.
3.2 Inquisitorial finances
The control over inquisitorial finances shifted from the Crown to the Inquisition in 1560.
Historians distinguish two periods of the evolution of inquisitorial finances defined by who
administered them.
1. 1480-1560
• The Royal treasury administered the Inquisition’s finances. The treasury paid all In-
quisition expenses (wages, ordinary and extraordinary expenses) and was in charge
of collecting confiscations, fines and penalties.
2. 1560-1834
• The Inquisition had its own treasury, which was completely independent of the
Royal treasury. Every district’s tribunal independently managed its own finances
under the supervision of the General Council of the Inquisition, La Suprema.
The primary expenses of the Inquisition were the salaries of the inquisitorial personnel,
ordinary expenses (expenses from the ordinary activity of the tribunals) and extraordinary
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expenses (construction and repairs costs, cost of feeding prisoners and the cost of the public
trials of the Inquisition, called Autos de fe).
Regarding revenues, while in the first period the only sources of income were confiscations
and fines, in the latter period the treasury of the Inquisition incorporated censos and canonries
as sources of revenue. Confiscations were monetary punishments imposed on any prisoner
convicted of heresy; fines and penalties were payments to allow prisoners who were not proven
guilty to avoid “life sentences” or monetary punishments; canonries were the income collected
from churches under Inquisitorial control; and censos were loans with high interest rates.
Additionally, the Inquisition acquired Juros (Crown’s bonds) from the King, from confiscations
or Royal concessions.
One of the possible causes of the change in control over Inquisition’s finances is the financial
burden of maintaining inquisitorial activity as argued by Millan (1984). I explore this idea in
the description of the theoretical framework in the next section.
4 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework presented in this section rationalizes why an absolute monarchy,
like the Spanish Crown, might adopt an institution like the Inquisition for the purposes of
repression: to impose its political ideology and purposes and to stamp out revolt.
This framework describes a mechanism that links wars and inquisitorial activity. The
main intuition behind it is that Government’s “demand” for repression (inquisitorial activity)
was greater during periods of war. Citizens were more likely to revolt when the Crown was
at war against other European powers, because external military effort diverted the Crown’s
attention away from domestic affairs. To prevent internal rebellions, the Inquisition should
conduct more trials when Spain was at war than when it was at peace. However, if internal
revolts were to happen with certainty, the Inquisition dropped its activity.18
The revolt of “Comunidades” (in 1520 in Castile), “Germanias’ (in 1520 in Valencia)’ and
“Alpujarras” (in 1568) are examples of how citizens took advantage of a weak situation (most
18The reader may think that a similar mechanism could explain repression in other countries and periods.
For example, political repression in Russia under Stalin. Harrison (2008) provides a similar argument to explain
Stalin’s political repression as a response to external threats.
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of the Spanish army was abroad) of the King to organize a revolt. For instance, the conflicts
of “Comunidades” and “Germanias’ developed during the trip of Charles V to Germany to be
crowned Emperor in 1520.19 The revolt of Alpujarras started when most of the army was in
the Netherlands to fight against the Dutch in the 80 years war.
The revolts of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640 provide another piece of anecdotal evidence.20
At that time, Spain was fighting the Eighty Years War in the Netherlands; the Thirty Years
War against France and England, among others; a continuation of the Mantuan War with
France, and it was involved in the war in Parma (giving support to the Pope). In this year,
the Spanish army was at its largest of any point in the period between 1500 and 1800. Over
120,000 men were fighting wars in Europe. In June of 1640 the Catalans revolted against
the King, who had to organize an army from the North of Castile to repress the revolt. In
December of the same year, Portugal revolted against Spain. The King tried to send an
“improvised” army as he did with the Catalan revolt, but he could not recruit enough men.
As a result, the Portuguese recovered their independence.
The aforementioned examples provide anecdotal evidence that there was a latent insurgent
activity ready to revolt against the King whenever he did not have a minimum level of internal
defence capacity because most of the army was abroad fighting against France, England,
Netherlands and the Ottoman Empire to become the greatest Empire in Europe. Consequently,
the Spanish King faced a trade-off when increasing his external military effort. A more powerful
army increased its relative power with respect to other European states, but it simultaneously
increased the probability of an internal revolt.
The objective of the Spanish King, as the one of any other European King at that time,
was to become the most powerful state in Europe. To do so, he had to maximize his relative
military strength with respect to other European rivals. However, by increasing his army
he had to face the costs of an internal revolt. As Gennaioli and Voth (2012) point out, the
political fragmentation of Spain faced by Spanish Kings at that time lead to less resources
to fight wars. In this paper, I complement their argument. It is not only about economic
19Although these conflicts started in 1519 just after the Cortes of Santiago, the peak of their activity occurred
when the King was outside Spain.
20Portugal was a part of Spain between 1580 and 1640.
10
resources to finance wars, but the threat of an internal revolt also matters. In this sense I
also complement their story by showing that the Spanish King used the Spanish Inquisition to
prevent such internal revolts to happen and, therefore, be able to fight against his European
counterparts.21
The theoretical framework captures the trade-off between increasing relative military strength
(raising an army) and the threat of internal revolts, and explores the relationship between Span-
ish external military effort and Inquisitorial activity (targeted at preventing internal revolts).
The Utility of the King is increasing on the relative strength of his army because it rep-
resents the relative power of the King versus his European counterparts. However, by raising
such an army he faces direct costs of maintaining an army and also a greater chance of internal
revolts. I assume that internal revolts diminish the image of power of the King as well as his
war resources.
Therefore, the Spanish Crown’s utility depends positively on the relative size of the Spanish
army with respect to the rest of European armies, and negatively on the direct costs of the
army, internal revolts, and costs of inquisitorial activity (repression). I define the costs of
internal revolts as the product of the probability that there is an internal revolt
(
aw1
R+aw1
)
and
its costs to the King, χ.
The King maximizes his utility, Uking, by choosing the optimal external military effort, w1,
and the opimal level of repression to prevent revolts, R,
Uking =
(
w1
w0
) 1
2
− µ w1 −
(
aw1
R+ aw1
)
χ− ρ R (1)
where w1 is the size of the Spanish army; w0 is the size of the army of the other European
states; µ w1 represents the cost of the army; R the level of repression (inquisitorial activity);
aw1 the level of insurgent activity. a indicates the level of response to the missing army in
Spain. That is, the larger a the more insurgent activity for a given external military effort
and, therefore, the higher the likelihood of an internal revolt. ρ R are the costs of employing
repression R. χ are the costs of an internal revolt.
21Preventing internal revolts can be understood as reducing political fragmentation.
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The first expression in equation (1) represents the benefits of the Spanish army, the relative
army force of Spain with respect to the European enemies’ army. The Spanish King’s utility
increases with this ratio because a larger relative army will increase the power of Spain in
Europe. However, there are decreasing marginal benefits of increasing the Spanish army
(holding w0 constant ).
The last three terms in equation (1) describe the costs of raising an army. The first term,
µw1, is the direct costs of maintaining an army. For simplicity, I assume that there are constant
marginal costs of maintaining an army. The second term,
(
aw1
R+aw1
)
, is the probability that
there is an internal revolt, which is defined as the ratio of insurgent activity aw1 divided by
the sum of aw1 and repressive activity (inquisitorial activity) R. Relative repressive activity
and insurgent activity determine the likelihood that there is an internal revolt.22 The King’s
utility decreases when the probability of an internal revolt increases. I also assume constant
marginal costs of inquisitorial activity. Thus, the costs of inquisitorial activity are ρ R.
This utility captures the two main objectives of the King. First, to become the most
powerful European State. Second, any internal revolt could damage the power of Spain.
The first order conditions are the following:
∂Uking
∂w1
=
w
− 1
2
1
2w
1
2
0
− aRχ
(R+ aw1)2
− µ = 0 (2)
∂Uking
∂R
=
aw1χ
(R+ aw1)2
− ρ = 0 (3)
From these first order conditions we can find the relation between the level of repression
and external military effort of the Spanish King.
R =
(
aw1χ
ρ
) 1
2
− a w1 (4)
From equation (4) we observe that the level of repressive activity (Inquisition trials) will
increase with Spanish external military effort as long as w1 < χ4aρ . Once this threshold
22This is a common functional form for the probability of winning a conflict in the conflict resolution litera-
ture. See Alesina Spolaore (2004), Tullock (1980) and Hirshleifer (1990). The likelihood of winning a conflict
depends on the relative investment of each of the parts involved in the conflict.
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is surpassed, inquisitorial activity will decrease,23 which implies an inverse-U relationship
between external military effort and repressive activity.
Intuitively, when the external military effort is low, repressive activity is larger than in-
surgent activity and, thus, the likelihood of an internal revolt will be low. However, when
external military effort is too high, repressive activity becomes relatively smaller relative to
insurgent activity and, therefore, the likelihood of an internal revolt increases. In the extreme
case, the likelihood of an internal revolt will be close to 1 and repressive activity (at any level)
cannot prevent an internal revolt.
The threshold (w1 < χ4aρ) is determined by the marginal cost of repression (ρ) and the
propensity towards insurgent activity (a). When insurgent activity is less reactive to external
military effort (a is low) and the marginal cost of repression, ρ, is low, the King will be able
to recruit a large army without fearing that repressive activity is relatively weak with respect
to insurgent activity. When the opposite happens, ρ and a are large, the King will be able to
recruit a much smaller army without an internal revolt. In this sense, the King is constrained
when deciding the size of his army.
It is interesting to note that we can relate finance control and inquisitorial behavior. As
seen in Section 3.2, The Spanish Kings maintained control of inquisitorial finances until 1560,
when the Inquisition took over. As a consequence, the King beared lower inquisitorial activity
costs. One way to incorporate this in the framework is decreasing ρ after 1560. Holding
everything else constant, a decrease in ρ means the King was able to form a larger army
without the fear of a decrease in internal repressive activity.
In fact, in 1560, the size of the Spanish army was at its maximum of the period 1478-1560.
After 1560, the size of the army increased in some years to more than double its maximum size
prior 1560. Figure 4 shows the relation between the size of the army and inquisitorial activity
before and after 1560. It shows how after the Inquisition took control of its own finances,
which decreased repression costs for the King, Spain was able to expand the size of its army
without the fear of a decrease in repressive activity. In fact, the Inquisition did increase its
activity. In both scenarios we observe an inverse-U relationship between inquisitorial activity
23Note that ∂R
∂w1
= 1
2
(
aχ
ρ w1
) 1
2 − a
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and external military effort, consistent with the main prediction of the framework.
In summary, there are three predictions of the framework: (i) there exists an inverse-U
relationship between inquisitorial intensity and wars; (ii) when the King gives the control of
inquisitorial finances to the Inquisition, he can increase the size of his army; (iii) the likelihood
and intensity of an internal revolt increases once inquisitorial effort drops.
Figure 8 shows prediction (i). The solid line shows the fitted values of the relationship
between army size (on the x-axis) and inquisitorial activity (on the left y-axis). We can see an
inverted-U shape relationship. The dashed line represents the fitted values of the relationship
between army size and an internal revolt index (on the right y axis). We can be observe how
these revolts increase when inquisitorial activity decreases and the size of the army is large.
Figure 6 depicts the second prediction of the framework: the number of wars increased once
the Inquisition took control of its own finances. The line describes inquisitorial intensity and
the bars represent the number of wars in which Spain was involved. This same analysis can
be performed using the data presented in Figure 7, which shows the size of the army fighting
wars instead of number of wars.
The Revolt of the Catalans in 1640 provides anecdotal evidence of the theoretical predic-
tions. Just prior to 1640, we can see in Figure 6 how inquisitorial intensity increased jointly
with the number of wars (and/or their intensity), but as soon as the quantity of wars reached
its maximum in 1640, inquisitorial effort declined and Catalans revolted.
5 Data
To empirically evaluate the three predictions of the theoretical framework, I bring together
time series data from Spanish inquisitorial districts with available information on trials and
information about wars in which Spain was involved. Moreover, to control for adverse weather
and economic shocks, I use data on the severity of the weather, as described by an index of
rainfall anomalies, wages and wheat prices. Below I present the sources of information for each
of these types of data in detail.
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5.1 Inquisition Data
5.1.1 Trials
Inquisitorial districts sent monthly activity reports to La Suprema, which controlled the ac-
tivity, procedures and finances of all districts. Therefore, there were two copies of each In-
quisitorial district activity report: one was kept in each Inquisitorial district and the second
was located in Madrid, where La Suprema met every weekday. Some of the archives of the
sees are still available, such as Barcelona Archives, which are held in the Arxiu de la Corona
Catalano-Aragonesa in Barcelona. However, most of them were lost, burned or destroyed.
Fortunately, most La Suprema archives can be consulted iat the National Historical Archives
in Madrid.
Historians have studied these archives and published books, articles and catalogues about
Inquisitorial activity (trials). The first catalogue about the Inquisiton trials (for the district
of Toledo) was published in 1903 by Vicente Vignau. In 1982, Perez Ramirez published the
catalogue of Cuenca after completing a version written by Cirac Estopañan in 1965. Several
years later, Blazquez Miguel published the catalogues of Murcia and Barcelona in 1987 and
1990, respectively. Contreras (1982) and Carcel (1980) and Carcel (1976) contain the lists of
trials in Galicia and Valencia, respectively. I use the aforementioned trial records to assemble
the time series data including the number of trials and inquisitorial intensity (trials per ten
thousand of inhabitants) per year and for the seven districts for which I have information:
Barcelona, Valencia, Galicia, Murcia, Cuenca, Granada and Cordoba.
In addition, I build a dataset containing individual data of 35,000 trials from the follow-
ing five districts: Barcelona, Valencia, Murcia, Cuenca and Toledo from the aforementioned
sources. These published trial records contain the names of the accused, the name of the
village where they lived, year of trial, the charges and the final sentence. In some cases, there
is information about the defendant’s occupation and nationality.
5.1.2 Finances
I match the trials data with detailed information on the Inquisition revenues and expenses.
Millan (1984) is the most extensive work on the finances of the Spanish Inquisition. It describes
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all sources of revenues and expenses of the Inquisition from 1560 to 1700. That is, information
on confiscations, fines and penalties, juros and censos, regarding revenues; and information on
wages, ordinary and extraordinary costs, regarding expenses.
5.2 Population Data
The data on Spanish population comes from several sources: the Census of 1591, Censo de
Floridablanca, Nadal (1974), and Contreras , Cerrillo Cruz, Garcia Carcel and Salomon (1964).
Missing year data are calculated by linear extrapolation of actual data.
5.3 Weather Data
Unfortunately, actual weather conditions were not recorded during the period under study.
I use instead a proxy for yearly rainfall anomalies measured by the intensity of ecclesiasti-
cal rogations for rain, from Barriendos and Martin-Vide (1998) and Barriendos and Rodrigo
(2008)). Rogation’s intensity levels range from one to five depending on the intensity of activ-
ities involved in each rogation. Level 1 would consist of a simple prayer for rain, while level
5 involved a procession of the local religious community to the nearest mount. The annual
index is defined by the yearly sum of the level of every rogation episode.
5.4 Wars and Internal Revolts Data
I use data on wars in which Spain was involved in a given year between 1490 and 1820 obtained
from Levy (1983) and Kiser, Drass, and Brustein (1995). Moreover, I use data on the size
of the Spanish army as a proxy for war intensity, obtained from Sorokin (1937). The author
describes the number of men who were fighting in several wars for Spain.
I use the information about internal revolts contained in Sorokin (1937) as well. There
is information about the existence of an internal revolt in a given year and an index of its
intensity. This index, which goes from 0 to 100, is calculated through a geometric average of
four elements: the extent of the area of the revolt, the population involved, its duration, and
the amount of violence. For example, the French Revolution has an index of 79.43, the revolt
of the Catalans in 1640 an index of 26.50 and the conflict of comunidades in 1520 an index of
34.20.
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5.5 Village Information
I use the Catastro de Ensenada (1749) to classify villages into three different types. Villages
can be classified as Realengas if they belonged to the King; de Señorío if they belonged to
a Noble; or Eclesiásticas or Abadengas if they were under Church’s jurisdiction. Catastro
de Ensenada contains information about village characteristics in 18th century Castile, and it
includes a specific question asking about the type of village.24 This survey only covers Castilian
territory. The classification for Catalonia is based on Bautista-Golobardas (1831) and Frigola
(1824). To obtain Valencia’s classification, I use data from Miñona and Bedoya (1826) and
Madoz (1848). Finally, if the villages could not be classified with the above mentioned sources,
I went through the city hall’s websites.
6 Empirical Strategy
To test the prediction of the framework that states that there is an inverse-U relationship
between war intensity and inquisition intensity (trials per 10,000 inhabitants), I estimate the
following model:
intensityit =β0 + β1 f(t) + β2 warst + β3 wars
2
t + β4 droughtsit+
+ β5 spilloverit−1 + β6 Djt + µi + it (5)
where intensityit is the number of trials per 10,000 inhabitants in district i at time t; warst is
the size of the Spanish army in war at time t; droughtsit represents the severity of the weather
in district i at time t; µi denotes district fixed effects, and Djt are three sets of dummies for
5 years prior and after the expulsion of the Moriscos, and the expulsion of the Jews and for
years after the French Revolution. I also control for a cubic time trend (f(t)).
In addition, I include yearly wheat prices and a droughts index at the district level to
control for further time-varying factors that may create local conflicts that require inquisitorial
intervention. Miguel (2005) and Oster (2004) show that severe weather conditions can cause
witchcraft episodes. Berger and Spoerer (2001) show that wheat prices, as a proxy for “shortfall
of food supply”, can predict revolutions.
24Figure 9 shows this question (2) of the survey for Albacete, whose representatives said that the village
belonged to the King.
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Finally, I include lagged intensity of the Inquisition in the subdivision of a particular district
(excluding the district under analysis) to control for spillover effects. That is, the number of
trials per 10,000 inhabitants at time t − 1 in the subdivision of the district under analysis.
For example, if a neighborhood district persecuted witches in the previous period, the district
under analysis might pursue more witchcraft trials because of peer effects.
If the empirical results are consistent with the first prediction of the framework, our co-
efficients of interest β2 and β3 will be positive and negative, respectively. This implies an
inverse-U shaped relationship between the number (or intensity) of wars and inquisitorial in-
tensity. That is, the size of the army fighting wars abroad increases inquisitorial intensity until
the former hits a threshold, after which inquisitorial intensity decreases with the size of the
army.
One may wonder that the repressive mechanism might have been relevant in those districts
that were more likely to initiate a revolt. For this reason, I complement my analysis with a
time series model for each of the districts.
6.1 Results
Table 4 shows the results for the Panel Data Analysis of the effects of army size on the activity
of the Spanish Inquisition. In all specifications, our main coefficients of interest β2 and β3 are
significantly positive and negative, respectively, indicating an inverse-U relationship between
army size and inquisitorial intensity. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients is consistent
across all specifications and both coefficients are jointly significant in most models, except
3 and 4. These results support the first prediction of the framework and are robust to the
most conservative specification in column (6) as well as to the inclusion of Inquisitor’s and
inquisitorial periods’ fixed effects.
Table 5 shows the results when clustering at the year level (column 1), correcting standard
errors for contemporaneous correlation across districts (column 2) and correcting for both
contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity (column 3). Previous results are robust to
these corrections. I cluster at the year level because the size of the army just varies across time
and not across districts. Correcting by heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation
allows me to increase the precision of my estimates. Although the joint test in column 2 do
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not let us reject that both army coefficients are jointly significant, we can observe that this
is the case for the other two columns. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficients do not
change and do not differ significantly from the results in Table 4, supporting the hypothesis of
an inverse-U relationship between war intensity (size of the army) and inquisitorial intensity
(trials per 10,000 inhabitants).
I repeat the analysis collapsing all information by decades. Table 6 shows the result of the
panel analysis where each observation refers to a district in a particular decade. The results
support the quadratic relationship between inquisitorial activity and war activity.
These results support the hypothesis of a repressive tool. When more resources are diverged
from internal control, the likelihood of an internal revolt increases; thus, the Inquisition would
increase its intensity to prevent it. However, when too many resources are diverted, a high
level of inquisitorial intensity would not stop a revolt; thus, intensity of inquisitorial activity
drops.
To investigate whether there is any inquisitorial district that is driving the results, I re-
peat the analysis using time series analysis separately for each district. Table 7 shows that
Barcelona, Granada and Valencia appear to drive the results. This result is not surprising, as
those were the areas that carried out most of the revolts against the Spanish Crown during
the period under analysis. Moreover, the Kings might be especially concerned about those
regions because they had been historically more belligerent than their counterparts. Granada
was the source of Muslim discontent and Barcelona was the capital of Catalonia, where two
of the most important revolts took place in 1640 and 1714.
To summarize, I find consistent evidence of a significant quadratic relation between number
of wars and intensity of the Inquisition. In particular, the marginal increase of the Spanish
Inquisition intensity is higher when war activity is not too high. However, when wars reach a
certain threshold inquisitorial intensity decreases. This would correspond to the first prediction
of the theoretical framework, emphasizing the role of the Inquisition as a repressive tool of the
Spanish Crown.
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6.2 Religious Persecution or Repression?
Tables 8 and 9 respectively show the total number of trials and relative activity for each type
of accusation sorted by districts. Panels A to E show inquisitorial activity in the five historical
periods described in section 3. Panels F show activity for the whole period of the Inquisition,
between 1478 and 1808. We observe that trials involving Lutheranism, Islam and Judaism
together represent slightly less than 50% of the total trials carried out by the Inquisition (see
Panel F of Table 9). Therefore, motivations for inquisitorial activity were not purely religious.
In fact, trials against other religions are carried out more importantly during the first years of
the Inquisition and in certain districts as Valencia and Murcia. Moreover, different districts
have one common objective, Judaism, and a more specific objective. For example, we can
see in Panel F in Tables 8 and 9 that Barcelona had more trials involving Lutheranism than
Granada in both absolute and relative terms; in Panel F in Tables 8 and 9, we can see that
Valencia had more trials involving Islam than Barcelona. Therefore, district characteristics
determined the type of inquisitorial trials that each region experienced. Possible explanations
for the differences across districts are the distance to the rest of Europe (for a higher activity
regarding Lutheranism), and the initial population associated with each of the “heresies”. For
example, Valencia had one of the highest concentrations of Moriscos, and that is reflected with
a greater number of inquisitorial trials involving Islam.
Therefore, these tables suggest that inquisitorial activity may have had different moti-
vations across time and across districts as well. To analyze if repression was one of these
motivations, I will use the whole dataset of 35,000 individual trials and its classification. I
run a Multinomial Logit to observe if the trials on some “heresies” responded to an increase in
foreign war intensity. The description of this process is the following:
Each unit of observation (xi, chargei) is a random draw from the population of trials across
regions and time, where i is a trial and charge=others, Judaism, Islam, Lutheranism, Bigamy,
Blasphemy. x includes a constant, the year when the trial occurred, a dummy for the region
where the trial happened, wheat price, army size and the interaction terms between region
and army size and year. The errors are i.i.d. with Weibull distribution and, therefore, the
response probabilities are:
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Pr(chargei = j|x) = exp(xβj)1+ΣJm=1exp(xβm)
(6)
for all j = Judaism, Islam,Lutheranism,Bigamy,Blasphemy, and
Pr(chargei = others|x) = 11+ΣJm=1exp(xβm)
(7)
Tables 10 and 11 present the marginal effects on the probability of having a trial with charge
j. The expression is the following (example: army size):
∂Pr(chargei = j|x)
∂xi,armysize
= Pr(chargei = j|x)
[
βj,armysize − Σ
J
m=1βm,armysizeexp(xβm)
1 + ΣJm=1exp(xβm)
]
(8)
If repression is one of the motivations of inquisitorial activity, trials of religious “heresies”
(Islam, Judaism and Lutheranism) should decrease with wars (or their intensity). However,
the likelihood of the rest of charges should increase with wars (or their intensity). The reason
for that increase is that charges that are not against other religions would be expected to
respond to the demand for repression, given the distraction caused by foreign wars, whereas
charges against other religions would respond more strongly to religious motives.
Table 10 shows that trials against other religions decreased with the size of the army.
In particular, an army of 10,000 men is associated with a 1% decrease on the probability
of being tried against Judaism, Islam or Lutheranism. Moreover, the probability of being
accused of Judaism decreases with time. This result suggests that trials against other religions
were particularly significant during the early stages of the Inquisition. In later periods, it
persecuted Catholic citizens. The results show that there was a change in the goal of the
inquisitorial activity over time. While in early stages the Inquisition persecuted non-Catholic
religions, repression seems to explain inquisitorial activity later on because of its persecution
of Catholic citizens. Finally, I also run a Multinomial Logit to see how a change in the size
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of the army affects the probability of being tried in a village under the King’s jurisdiction
or in a village under the jurisdiction of a member of the church or a noble (Lord). Because
the most important revolts in Spain started in villages that the King did not control (e.g.,
Germanias in Valencia and Comunidades in Castile), I expect an increase in the size of the
army abroad to be associated with an increase in the probability of being tried in a village that
was not controlled by the King. In other words, the King would like to increase repression in
the villages where he did not have direct control.
Results in Table 11 show that villages that were under the jurisdiction of a Lord or the
Church are associated with a higher probability of having a trial due to an increase in the size
of the army. However, army size had a negative impact on the probability of being subjected
to a trial in villages that belonged to the Crown. Therefore, results show a higher demand for
repression in villages where the King had less control.
6.3 War, Inquisitorial finances and Trials
The relationship between wars, finances and inquisitorial activity may raise still another rea-
sonable doubt: an increase in inquisitorial intensity could be due to a greater need for the
Spanish Crown to finance its wars. If this were the case, we would observe a positive correla-
tion between inquisitorial activity and inquisitorial revenues.
In this section first I explore if the activity of the Inquisition (i.e. trials) is related to
inquisitorial revenues. Second, I analyze if an increase in inquisitorial activity could be due to
a greater need for the Spanish Crown to finance wars.
Table 12 shows the results of a simple regression of sources of inquisitorial revenue as
confiscations, censos and canonries on the size of the Spanish army. Table 13 show correlations
between army size, trials and inquisitorial revenue variables. We observe that neither army
size nor trials are positively correlated to an increase in inquisitorial revenues. Actually, results
show a negative relation: the greater the number of trials and the intensity of war, the less
inquisitorial revenues.
Tables 14 and 15 show that confiscations and other sources of revenues are not related
either to the activity of the inquisition or to war activity. They show the results at a national
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(column 1) and at a district level of regressing confiscations or other sources of revenues on
the number of trials as well as on the size of the Spanish army. The sign of the coefficients
on both war activity and trial activity is not positive, as we would expect if the Inquisition
was carrying on trials to extract wealth from population. In fact, These results suggest that
the sources of revenue of the Inquisition are not related to the need of financing the wars of
the Spanish King. Moreover, trial activity is not related to revenues. Granada appears to be
the only district in which there is a positive and significant relationship between trials and
revenues.
These simple correlations suggest two things. First, the Inquisition did not increase its
activity to obtain an increase in its revenues. Therefore, inquisitorial trials do not appear
to be income motivated, as Llorente (1822) proposed. Second, army size did not increase
inquisitorial revenues. Thus, it does not appear that the Inquisition increased its revenues in
order to pay for the wars that the Spanish Crown was fighting. This excludes the possible
argument that suggests that the Inquisition increased its activity in order to finance Spanish
wars. In fact, the opposite can be observed: when the intensity of the wars increased, the
Inquisition experienced a decrease in its revenues. Therefore, these results support the role of
the Inquisition as a government tool for repression.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows strong evidence that the Inquisition was a repressive tool of the Spanish
Crown. Using both theoretical and empirical evidence, I show an inverse-U relationship be-
tween wars and inquisitorial activity. The Inquisition can supply the repression sought by the
King as long as his external military effort is low enough. However, when an internal revolt
will occur with certainty (external military effort is too large), the Inquisition will decrease its
activity.
In addition, I show that religious persecution was one of the primary motivations for the
Inquisition during its early stages. However, repression better explains its behavior later
on. Although the Spanish Inquisition was initially created to persecute religions other than
Catholicism, later on the Spanish Kings realized they could use it as a repressive tool. Finally,
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I show suggestive evidence that the Inquisition was not an extractive tool to finance Spanish
King’s wars.
Explaining the motivations behind inquisitorial activity sheds light on the institutional
framework of Spain, the Inquisition, and its development in early modern Spain as well as on
the mechanisms through which a repressive institution affects long-term economic performance.
If the Inquisition had a negative impact in the long term, it is important to discern what kind of
institution it was to explain how it affected economic development. From the results showed
in the paper, it does not seem that the Inquisition could have affected Spanish economic
development due to its effects on secure property rights. However, it might have affected
Spanish development through trust and a lack of innovation.
Given the nature of inquisitorial trials, accusations always remained anonymous, levels
of interpersonal trust and levels of trust on institutions might have been negatively affected.
Poor levels of trust are identified by Nunn and Wantchekon (forthcoming) to directly affect
economic performance in the long-run. Given the inquisitorial repression of other religions as
well as of ideas that differed from the established ones, one may think that the level of Spanish
creativity may have been harmed. Poor creativity would be linked to poor levels of innovation,
which may have hindered Spanish development in long-run.
Although plausible, these explanations are just mere hypotheses. Therefore, further re-
search should address first if the Inquisition harmed Spanish economic development and, sec-
ond, if trust and innovation are two possible channels of this effect.
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Figures
Figure 1: Witchcraft and Inquisition Trials in Europe
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Figure 2: Inquisition Trials in Spain
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Figure 3: Witchcraft and Inquisition Intensity in Europe
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Figure 4: Inquisition Intensity in Spain
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Figure 5: Districts of the Spanish Inquisition
Districts under Aragonese subdivision are in grey. White districts belong to Castilian subdivision.
Source: Contreras and Henningsen (1986)
Figure 6: Wars and Inquisitorial Activity
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Figure 7: Army Size and Inquisitorial Activity
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Figure 8: Army Size and Inquisitorial Activity
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Figure 9: Catastre of Ensenada
Figure 10: Regional Inquisitorial Activity
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Figure 11: Province Inquisitorial Activity
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Tables
Table 1: European Tribunals Activity
Tribunal Period Trials Trials/year Executions
Spanish Monarchy 1540-1700 49,092 305 3%
Venetian Inquisition 1541-1592 1,560 30 1%
Toulouse Parliament 1500-1560 1,074 18 6%
Bordeaux Parliament 1541-1559 477 25 4%
Chambre Ardente (Paris) 1547-1550 557 139 7%
Coimbra Inquisition 1567-1631 3,837 59 7%
Source: Parker (1982).
Table 2: Typology of trials
Heresy / District Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.390 0.448 0.329 0.339 0.503 0.405 0.699 0.467
Judaism 0.207 0.359 0.260 0.206 0.279 0.201 0.346 0.271
Islam 0.039 0.080 0.059 0.036 0.224 0.204 0.323 0.161
Lutheranism 0.144 0.009 0.010 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.035
Non-religious trials 0.610 0.552 0.671 0.661 0.497 0.595 0.301 0.533
Bigamy 0.059 0.022 0.060 0.009
Blasphemy 0.042 0.096 0.066 0.026
Superstition 0.096 0.025 0.050 0.063 0.064 0.052 0.043 0.057
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Table 3: Inquisition intensity and wars
War=0 War=1 War=2 War=3 War=4
Spain 0.610 0.675 1.226 1.069 0.720
(0.635) (0.795) (0.805) (0.578) (0.568)
Barcelona 0.230 0.420 0.764 0.857 0.275
(0.535) (0.846) (1.150) (0.466) (0.373)
Murcia 0.854 0.921 1.984 2.563 2.031
(1.539) (1.951) (2.891) (2.478) (1.466)
Cuenca 0.919 0.986 1.977 1.411 0.768
(1.534) (1.481) (1.481) (0.733) (0.327)
Cordoba 0.258 0.232 0.631 0.361 1.000
(0.551) (0.951) (1.471) (1.173) (1.747)
Valencia 0.585 0.680 1.438 1.620 0.902
(1.273) (1.605) (1.538) (2.454) (0.850)
Galicia 0.088 0.078 0.213 0.351 0.259
(0.256) (0.216) (0.313) (0.294) (0.185)
Granada 0.812 0.965 1.772 2.027 1.653
(1.694) (1.546) (2.405) (1.320) (1.787)
Obs 66 155 67 30 12
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 4: Inquisitorial Activity and Spanish War Intensity
Dependent variable: Inquisitorial intensity (trials per 10,000 inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Army Size (10,000) 0.112** 0.123** 0.114* 0.128* 0.076** 0.114
(0.042) (0.046) (0.049) (0.057) (0.029) (0.084)
Army Size squared -0.009** -0.010* -0.010* -0.011* -0.007** -0.012*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
Droughts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Jewish expulsion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moriscos expulsion Yes Yes Yes Yes
French Revolution Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spillover effects Yes Yes Yes
Lagged intensity Yes Yes
Wheat prices Yes
Mean Intensity 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Joint test 3.87 7.80 2.90 2.92 4.42 9.42
Prob > χ2 0.083 0.020 0.146 0.144 0.078 0.020
Observations 1,855 1,590 1,590 1,433 1,433 657
R-squared 0.185 0.167 0.181 0.158 0.313 0.294
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the district
level. All columns include cubic time trend, as well as district fixed effects.
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Table 5: Inquisitorial Activity and Spanish War Intensity
Dependent variable: Inquisitorial intensity (trials per 10,000 inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3)
Army Size (10,000) 0.076* 0.076 0.076*
(0.039) (0.047) (0.039)
Army Size squared -0.007** -0.007* -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Droughts Yes Yes Yes
Jewish expulsion Yes Yes Yes
Moriscos expulsion Yes Yes Yes
French Revolution Yes Yes Yes
Lagged intensity Yes Yes Yes
Spillover effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean Intensity 0.8 0.8 0.8
R2 0.313 0.313 0.313
Obs 1433 1433 1433
Joint test 3.83 3.98 5.59
Prob > χ2 0.023 0.137 0.061
Corrected standard errors in parentheses. All columns include
cubic time trend, as well as district fixed effects.
Table 6: Decade Panel
Dependent variable: Inquisitorial intensity (trials per 10,000 inhabitants)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Army Size 0.327** 0.834*** 0.273* 0.072
(0.157) (0.222) (0.162) (0.045)
Army Size Squared -0.002 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Droughts Yes Yes Yes
Moriscs expulsion Yes Yes Yes
Jewish expulsion Yes Yes Yes
French Rev Yes Yes Yes
Council Trent Yes Yes Yes
Lagged intensity Yes Yes
Wheat Price Yes
Mean Intensity 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Joint test 7.06 17.44 4.97 2.76
Prob > χ2 0.0293 0.0002 0.0834 0.256
Obs 238 204 198 91
Standard errors clustered at the district level. All columns include
cubic time trend, as well as district fixed effects. ( *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Table 7: Inquisitorial activity and Spanish war intensity: Time Series
Dependent variable: Inquisitorial intensity (trials per 10,000 inhabitants)
Spain Cordoba Granada Cuenca Murcia Valencia Barcelona
Army Size (10,000) 0.052* 0.051 0.225** -0.017 -0.054 0.203* 0.141**
(0.031) (0.074) (0.094) (0.055) (0.123) (0.110) (0.069)
Army Size squared -0.004* -0.005 -0.021*** 0.001 0.005 -0.017** -0.012**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
R2 0.599 0.079 0.341 0.608 0.307 0.430 0.276
Obs 263 257 263 263 263 191 191
Joint test 1.469 0.455 4.709 0.049 0.213 2.258 2.577
Prob > F 0.232 0.635 0.01 0.952 0.808 0.107 0.079
Standard errors in parentheses. All columns include cubic time trend, as well as spillover effects,
droughts index and lagged intensity. ( *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Table 8: Classification of Trials per Heresy and District
Panel A. From 1478 to 1520
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Trials 1142 297 1170 0 0 12 3244 5865
Religious Trials 1133 10 991 12 3105 5251
Judaism 1131 10 983 12 3091 5227
Islam 2 0 8 12 22
Lutheranism 0 0 0 2 2
Non-religious trials 3 287 44 0 0 0 17 351
Bigamy 2 0 0 2 4
Blasphemy 0 0 17 4 21
Superstition 1 0 27 11 39
Others 0 287 0 287
Panel B. From 1520 to 1570
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Trials 686 217 2682 237 1020 607 1053 6502
Religious Trials 211 17 1004 767 405 126 2446
Judaism 0 1 809 69 282 0 1163
Islam 47 11 134 598 0 95 1008
Lutheranism 164 5 61 0 123 31 275
Non-religious trials 522 200 1678 237 253 202 927 4056
Bigamy 58 0 103 49 38 6 254
Blasphemy 57 0 259 132 23 19 490
Superstition 14 0 48 6 2 3 3 76
Others 393 200 1268 50 251 138 899 3236
Panel C. From 1570 to 1621
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Trials 1631 602 2969 1153 2714 1080 3725 13874
Religious Trials 349 336 614 237 1092 517 2910 6055
Judaism 5 189 170 129 352 81 21 947
Islam 70 137 413 3 740 436 2732 4531
Lutheranism 164 5 61 0 123 31 577
Non-religious trials 1282 267 2355 916 1622 563 815 7819
Bigamy 124 57 37 29 247
Blasphemy 112 391 120 149 772
Superstition 152 15 114 28 30 31 76 446
Others 892 252 1793 888 1592 375 561 6353
Panel D. From 1621 to 1700
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Trials 1657 602 1592 815 2800 1390 1025 9881
Religious Trials 469 380 431 493 1337 560 185 3859
Judaism 23 378 424 323 1274 318 15 2755
Islam 93 2 4 76 67 242 85 569
Lutheranism 353 0 3 94 0 0 85 535
Non-religious trials 1188 222 1161 322 1463 830 820 6022
Bigamy 93 22 71 41 229
Blasphemy 62 158 23 98 63 394
Superstition 279 27 175 106 358 92 298 1335
Others 754 195 806 193 1105 669 418 4064
Panel E. From 1701 to 1808
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Trials 568 163 1151 0 953 1111 0 3946
Religious Trials 51 100 106 671 208 1136
Judaism 17 98 99 397 155 764
Islam 8 1 2 274 53 340
Lutheranism 26 1 5 0 0 32
Non-religious trials 517 63 1045 182 903 2810
Bigamy 61 28 103 192
Blasphemy 18 85 34 137
Superstition 102 5 114 87 94 402
Others 336 58 818 95 672 2072
Panel F. From 1478 to 1808
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Trials 5684 1881 9564 2205 7487 4200 9047 40068
Religious Trials 2213 843 3146 746 3771 1702 6326 18747
Judaism 1176 676 2485 454 2092 846 3127 10856
Islam 220 151 561 79 1679 856 2924 6470
Lutheranism 817 16 100 213 0 0 275 1421
Non-religious trials 3471 1038 6418 3716 2498 2721 21321
Bigamy 334 211 253 77 864
Blasphemy 241 914 279 231 1665
Superstition 548 47 478 140 477 220 388 2298
Others 2348 991 4815 1459 1746 2025 16494
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Table 9: Proportion of Heresies per District and Time Period
Panel A. From 1478 to 1520
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.992 0.034 0.847 1 0.958 0.893
Judaism 0.990 0.034 0.840 1 0.953 0.891
Islam 0.002 0.000 0.007 0 0.004 0.002
Lutheranism 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.001 0.000
Non-religious trials 0.003 0.966 0.015 0 0.042 0.107
Bigamy 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
Blasphemy 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001
Superstition 0.001 0.000 0.023 0 0.003 0.005
Panel B. From 1520 to 1570
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.308 0.079 0.375 0.067 0.654 0.668 0.119 0.376
Judaism 0 0.005 0.302 0.008 0.068 0.465 0.000 0.179
Islam 0.069 0.051 0.050 0.000 0.586 0.203 0.090 0.155
Lutheranism 0.239 0.023 0.023 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.042
Non-religious trials 0.692 0.921 0.625 0.933 0.346 0.332 0.881 0.624
Bigamy 0.085 0.038 0.207 0.063 0.006
Blasphemy 0.083 0.097 0.557 0.038 0.018
Superstition 0.020 0 0.018 0.025 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.012
Panel C. From 1570 to 1620
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.215 0.559 0.204 0.206 0.403 0.479 0.781 0.437
Judaism 0.003 0.314 0.057 0.112 0.130 0.075 0.006 0.068
Islam 0.043 0.228 0.139 0.003 0.273 0.404 0.733 0.327
Lutheranism 0.168 0.017 0.010 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.042
Non-religious trials 0.785 0.441 0.796 0.794 0.597 0.521 0.219 0.624
Bigamy 0.171 0.021 0.061 0.027
Blasphemy 0.152 0.144 0.726 0.194 0.138
Superstition 0.093 0.025 0.038 0.024 0.011 0.029 0.020 0.032
Panel D. From 1621 to 1700
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.283 0.631 0.271 0.604 0.479 0.403 0.181 0.391
Judaism 0.014 0.628 0.266 0.396 0.455 0.229 0.015 0.279
Islam 0.056 0.003 0.003 0.093 0.024 0.174 0.083 0.058
Lutheranism 0.213 0.000 0.002 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.054
Non-religious trials 0.717 0.369 0.729 0.396 0.521 0.597 0.819 0.609
Bigamy 0.056 0.014 0.051 0.040
Blasphemy 0.037 0.099 0.028 0.071 0.061
Superstition 0.168 0.045 0.110 0.130 0.128 0.066 0.291 0.135
Panel E. From 1701 to 1808
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.086 0.613 0.092 0 0.705 0.188 0 0.288
Judaism 0.030 0.601 0.086 0.417 0.138 0.194
Islam 0.014 0.006 0.002 0.288 0.050 0.086
Lutheranism 0.046 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.008
Non-religious trials 0.914 0.387 0.908 0 0.295 0.912 0 0.712
Bigamy 0.107 0.024 0.093 0.000
Blasphemy 0.032 0.074 0.031 0.000
Superstition 0.180 0.031 0.099 0.091 0.085 0.102
Panel F. From 1478 to 1808
Barcelona Cordoba Cuenca Galicia Granada Murcia Valencia Spain
Religious Trials 0.390 0.448 0.329 0.339 0.503 0.405 0.699 0.467
Judaism 0.207 0.359 0.260 0.206 0.279 0.201 0.346 0.271
Islam 0.039 0.080 0.059 0.036 0.224 0.204 0.323 0.161
Lutheranism 0.144 0.009 0.010 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.035
Non-religious trials 0.610 0.552 0.671 0.661 0.497 0.595 0.301 0.533
Bigamy 0.059 0.022 0.060 0.009
Blasphemy 0.042 0.096 0.066 0.026
Superstition 0.096 0.025 0.050 0.063 0.064 0.052 0.043 0.057
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Table 10: Army Size Effect on the Proportion of Trials: Marginal Effects
Judaism Islam Lutheranism Bigamy Blasphemy Others
Army Size (in 10,000) -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0002 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.001)
Year -0.001*** -0.0002*** 0.00003 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0009***
(0.000) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Comunidad Valenciana 0.084*** 0.334*** -0.099*** -0.042*** 0.009 -0.286***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010)
Murcia 0.178*** 0.186*** -0.093*** -0.016*** 0.027*** -0.284***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015)
Castilla la Mancha -0.073*** 0.035*** -0.117*** -0.019*** 0.093*** 0.080***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Madrid 0.014 -0.014 -0.110*** -0.014 0.075*** 0.049***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027)
Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
Observations 21126 21126 21126 21126 21126 21126
Standard errors in parentheses. Judaism=1 if the charge of the trial is Judaism. Similarly for the
rest of charge options. Catalunya is the ommitted region.
Table 11: Army Size Effect and Village Types: Marginal Effects
King Church Lord
Army Size (in 10,000) -0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.0004) (0.001)
Year 0.0005*** 0.00005** -0.0006***
(0.0000) (0.00002) (0.0000)
Comunidad Valenciana -0.309*** -0.112*** 0.404***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003)
Murcia 0.054 -0.100 -0.049***
(0.051) (0.062) (0.010)
Castilla la Mancha -0.184*** -0.082*** 0.136***
(0.009) (0.019) (0.006)
Madrid -0.067*** -0.035*** 0.107***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
R2 0.12 0.12 0.12
Obs 22424 22424 22424
Standard errors in parentheses. Lord=1 if a village be-
longed to a Lord, Church=1 if a village belonged to the
Church and Crown=1 if a village to the Crown. Catalunya
is the ommitted region.
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Table 12: Inquisitorial Income and Army Size
Confiscations Censos Canonries
Army Size -17,713*** -43,595 -22,362
(6,089) (10,903) (3,467)
Cubic Time Trend Yes Yes Yes
(0.009)
Observations 126 126 122
R2 0.202 0.422 0.460
Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Inquisitorial Income, Trials and Army Size
Army Size Trials Confiscations Censos Canonries
Army Size 1
Trials -0.0322 1
Confiscations -0.2289 -0.26 1
Censos -0.295 -0.5011 0.5119 1
Canonries -0.4333 -0.4331 0.7288 0.7253 1
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